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Executive Summary 
The electricity sector plays a central role in the 
European Union’s efforts to achieve greenhouse gas 
(GHG) reductions of at least 20% by 2020 
compared to 1990 levels. While the electricity sector 
is currently responsible for about one-third of 
Europe’s total energy-related GHG emissions, there 
are large potentials for reducing emissions. 
Mitigation strategies will need to focus on more 
efficient electricity use, but also on improved 
conversion rates and new technologies such as 
renewables and carbon capture and storage (CCS). 
Apart from mitigation of climate change, the sector 
will also have to adapt to climate change. Global 
warming will have a significant impact on the 
ability to generate electricity and to deliver it 
without interruption. This ADAM-CEPS Policy 
Brief focuses on four issues relevant to the nexus 
between climate change and the electricity sector.  
The paper first elaborates on the impacts of climate 
change on the European electricity sector and on 
related adaptation needs. Southern countries will 
most likely be faced with less demand for heating 
but substantially increased demand for air 
conditioning. They may also experience losses in 
hydropower and problems with cooling of thermal 
power plants. Northern countries will equally 
experience less demand for heating and may gain 
potential for electricity production from 
hydropower. At the same time, they may have to 
adapt to more storms and heavy precipitation. In 
both regions, electricity supply disruptions due to 
storms, floods and heat waves may increase the 
need for more decentralised electricity generation in 
order to avoid negative impacts on electricity users. 
The next section focuses on policy options to 
facilitate the transition of the electricity sector 
towards a well-adapted, carbon-lean electricity 
system. A stable and predictable policy framework 
is a necessary precondition for investment decisions 
by the private sector. However, policy instruments 
need to be assessed according to their effects on 
wealth distribution, choice of technology and time 
horizon. Similarly, affected groups (e.g. producers, 
investors, industries, households) need to be taken 
into account to enhance the political feasibility of 
policy interventions. Many EU member states are 
likely to opt for combinations of policy instruments 
in order to overcome various sectoral or technology-
specific barriers and to promote non-fossil options 
with substantial innovative and cost-reduction 
potentials.  
An assessment of technologies and technological 
change  shows that the electricity sector could 
contribute more than its proportional share to the 
EU GHG reduction target, if the most cost-effective 
options are addressed. These include a more 
efficient use and production of electricity, more co-
generation, continuing substitution towards natural 
gas, more nuclear energy and renewables as well as 
realising the potentials of carbon capture and storage 
(CCS) after 2020.  
Finally, the paper analyses European choices in a 
global context. Stringent climate change policies in 
Europe may have the potential to guide and 
accelerate the world’s technological path towards 
sustainability. We suggest reducing the risk of 
‘carbon leakage’ by shielding energy-intensive 
industries from competitive pressures, e.g. by 
introducing border tax adjustments. However, we 
also highlight the benefits of international trade, 
which will allow efficient and low- (or zero) carbon 
solutions to be produced cost effectively in 
countries with low labour cost and to be diffused 
quickly on world markets.  
Introduction 
In spring 2007, the European Union committed 
itself to greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions reductions 
of 20% by 2020 compared to 1990, and to 
reductions of 30% conditional on a global climate 
change agreement for the period beyond 2012. In 
addition, the EU agreed to increase the share of 
renewable energies in total energy consumption to 
20% by 2020.
1 Through these targets, the EU aims 
to establish itself as a global climate champion in 
the attempt to limit average global temperature 
increases to 2° C above pre-industrial levels.
2  
Europe’s electricity sector is central to climate 
change mitigation strategies, due to: 
•  its role in greenhouse gas emissions, amounting 
to about one-third of total energy-related GHG 
emissions; 
•  its potential for emissions reductions, indirectly 
through more efficient electricity use and more 
efficient use of electricity-intensive materials, 
and directly through improved conversion 
efficiencies, substitution of fossil fuels and CCS;  
•  its potential as an emissions-lean energy carrier, 
for example in the transport sector, which is 
currently responsible for about one-fourth of 
European energy-related GHG emissions; 
•  its central role in energy security, linked to the 
use of natural gas; and 
•  its links to other political issues, such as 
deregulation, competitiveness of electricity-
intensive basic products, nuclear energy, and 
consumer welfare.  
                                                      
1 See European Council (2007). 
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One research stream within the ADAM project
3 
focuses on the implications of mitigation and 
adaptation strategies for the electricity sector. The 
project analyses measures that could reconcile 
economic growth and development objectives with 
low GHG emissions, assessing costs and their 
implications for the European and global economy. 
Equally important, it focuses on how costly policy 
errors can be avoided.  
Apart from mitigation of climate change, the 
electricity sector will also need to adapt to global 
warming. A warmer world requires less heating and 
more cooling. It also changes river flows and the 
frequency of extreme weather events, as well as the 
ability to generate electricity and to deliver it 
without disruptions. The ADAM project therefore 
also explores the links and feedbacks between 
adaptation and mitigation. 
This third ADAM-CEPS Policy Brief
4 elaborates on 
these issues from a research perspective, but in a 
policy-relevant way. Section 1 describes the impacts 
of a warming world on the electricity system with 
regard to electricity demand and supply, and 
elaborates on the necessary adaptation strategies. 
Section 2 analyses policy instruments in support of 
the necessary transition, and explores biases 
regarding political feasibility. Section 3 analyses 
technologies and technological change, both for 
short-term emissions reductions until 2020 and with 
a longer-term view on a low-carbon electricity 
system in Europe. Finally, section 4 deals with 
opportunities and challenges of different policies for 
the European electricity sector in a global context.  
1.  Climate change impacts and 
adaptation in the European 
electricity sector 
Adaptation to climate change will be required on the 
energy supply side (electricity production, 
transmission and distribution) as well as on the 
demand side. The intensity of required adaptation 
will depend on future GHG emissions and will be 
different across member states depending on their 
geographical location, present climate and future 
changes. Countries near the Atlantic or the North 
and Baltic seas will most probably have to adapt 
                                                      
3 ‘Adaptation and Mitigation Strategies: Supporting 
European Climate Policy’ (ADAM), funded by the 
European Commission. 
4 The first ADAM-CEPS Policy Brief (Aaheim & Aasen, 
2008) explored the economics of adaptation. The second 
ADAM-CEPS Policy Brief (see Aaheim et al., 2008), 
which drew upon discussions at an ADAM seminar, dealt 
with adaptation to climate change in the context of the 
European Commission’s Green Paper on Adaptation. 
less to temperature increases but may have to adapt 
more to storms and heavy precipitation. Countries in 
the Mediterranean area and those with more 
continental climates will need to adapt more to 
temperature increases and related increases in 
electricity demand.  
Impacts of and adaptation to climate change in 
electricity generation in Europe are difficult to 
estimate beyond 2020, because the system is likely 
to change substantially due to a shift towards a low-
carbon economy and possibly also to more 
decentralised electricity generation. Until 2020, 
climate change impacts on the electricity system are 
rather small and uncertain (e.g. impacts of heat 
waves and low river flows in summer on thermal 
power plants will become important after 2020; 
wind damage is uncertain; electricity plants are 
usually not built in flood-risk areas; and the sea-
level rise will be negligible in the lifetime of 
existing electricity plants). Blackouts/brownouts, 
whilst extremely costly for the economy, are more 
likely to be related to insufficient planning and 
infrastructure, particularly transmission lines – and 
less to climate change.  
1.1  Impacts and adaptation in electricity 
conversion plants 
Rising temperatures of the atmosphere and rivers 
will result in lower efficiencies of thermal power 
plants. This is mainly due to higher power demand 
for pumps to maintain desired condensing 
temperatures and also due to changes from wet to 
dry cooling towers. The adaptation of electricity 
generation will also affect electricity generated with 
renewable energy sources. 
•  Rising precipitation in countries north of the 
Alps and Portugal, as well as melting glaciers in 
the Alps will increase run-off water and increase 
the potential for hydro electricity generation. 
With expected additional precipitation of at least 
40 mm per year, this will particularly be the case 
in Ireland, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, 
Belgium, the Nordic and the Baltic states. In 
some countries, however, more frequent floods 
may result in minor hydro-electricity production 
cuts. In Mediterranean countries, hydropower 
generation is likely to suffer from reduced 
precipitation, particularly in the winter season 
due to changing climate patterns. Such 
reductions are expected in some member states 
that have already experienced inadequate water 
supply in some years (Cyprus, Malta, Greece, 
Southern Italy, Spain, Portugal, Bulgaria and 
Romania).  4 |Eskeland, Jochem, Neufeldt, Traber, Rive & Behrens 
•  Higher temperatures and atmospheric CO2 
concentrations in moderate climates (north of the 
Alps) may benefit the growth of biomass. This 
may favour electricity generation from 
agricultural crops, manure and wood chips.  
•  Efficiency of photovoltaic plants could slightly 
be reduced due to higher temperatures, 
particularly during heat waves. 
•  Increasing average wind velocities improve the 
electricity output of wind converters. However, 
the extent of increasing wind velocities is still 
unknown, and higher frequencies of heavy 
storms may negatively affect total annual wind 
power generation.  
•  Brownouts and blackouts due to storms, floods 
and heat waves may lead to more decentralised 
electricity generation in order to avoid the 
impacts of interruptions on supply for certain 
electricity users. However, there are almost no 
empirical studies on this issue.  
1.2  Impacts and adaptation in electricity 
transmission  
Damage to electricity transmission lines has been 
observed during all heavy winter storms in the last 
15 years. Examples include: 
•  the icy winter storm in 2005, which revealed that 
the steel pillars of the transmission lines of RWE 
in Germany were aging faster than expected. 
RWE will have to re-enforce 28,000 pillars of its 
transmission lines with an estimated investment 
of €500 million to adapt the system to heavy 
storms;  
•  the storm ‘Emma’ in late February 2008, which 
interrupted transmission and distribution lines 
leading to outages in several European countries.  
Climate change is also likely to result in some 
electricity transmission losses due to higher average 
temperatures. Heat waves may considerably 
increase resistance of power lines as increased air 
conditioning coincides with higher transmission 
demand and low generating capacity (due to reduced 
cooling capacities of thermal power plants).  
It is unclear how much retrofitting of the European 
transmission line network will be needed during the 
next decade and how it may influence transmission 
and distribution. As changes in frequency, force and 
regional distribution of heavy storms are likely to be 
poorly forecasted, surprises cannot be excluded. 
These uncertainties, stemming from a lack of 
knowledge in natural sciences regarding extreme 
events, will become more important in the case of 
very long re-investment cycles of large thermal 
power plants and high voltage transmission lines.  
Uncertainties regarding the impacts of climate 
change, and extreme events in particular, may be 
addressed by adhering to the precautionary 
principle, which favours policies that support 
efficient and low-emitting technologies, behaviours 
and life styles. The stringency of (and expectations 
about) future climate policy will depend on the 
magnitude of real future climate change impacts, 
and on how costly adaptation will prove to be.  
Finally, European policy responses will also depend 
on mitigation efforts of large global emitters (USA, 
China, India, Japan, etc.). Their climate change 
policy will in part set the stage for more or less need 
for adaptation in Europe. In addition, it will have a 
large influence on technological developments and 
the market for new technologies. Uncertainty 
regarding mitigation in high-emitting regions must 
result in efforts of foreign policy and for 
international cooperation and technology policy, 
including publicly funded RD&D. Openness for 
technical and entrepreneurial innovations in areas of 
zero or low-emitting technologies is important, 
keeping in mind their emissions reduction potential, 
their cost reduction potential and their expected 
acceptance in Europe. 
The transition towards a zero or low-carbon 
electricity sector will require the exploitation of 
profitable potentials for efficient electricity use, of 
foreign policy and international cooperation and of 
innovation policy. The interdependence of various 
policy fields calls for close cooperation between the 
European Commission, EU member states and 
industry, including utilities which will have to revise 
their business concepts from merely supplying 
electricity towards supplying least-cost energy 
solutions to their customers.  
1.3  Impacts and adaptation in electricity 
demand and final energy sectors  
In most European countries, the amount of energy 
required for heating greatly exceeds the energy used 
for space cooling. However, cooled floor area is 
steadily increasing due to higher internal loads, the 
spread of glass facades, and rising standards of 
comfort and per capita income. Events like the 
extraordinarily hot August of 2003 are accelerating 
this trend. Over the long term, rising mean annual 
temperatures (e.g. 1.3° C during the 20th century in 
Switzerland) are increasing the specific energy 
demand for space cooling. Aebischer et al. (2007) 
report an increasing incidence of thermal discomfort 
resulting from overheating of buildings during 
summer, both due to building retrofits and climate 
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For much of Europe, increases in electricity demand 
for cooling will be outweighed by reductions in the 
need for heating energy. However, electricity 
required for cooling is far more carbon-intensive 
than energy used for heating (e.g. gas, oil). 
Depending on the final energy mix for heating and 
cooling and the primary energy mix of the 
electricity supply in member states, net CO2 
emissions could thus even increase.  
Preliminary modelling results suggest a decrease in 
heating demand  of 11% in the Nordic and Baltic 
countries, a decrease of 12-16% in the other 
countries to the north of the Alps and a 16-33% 
decrease in Mediterranean countries by the year 
2050 for a business-as-usual scenario.
5 Econometric 
analyses for several European countries and 
different climatic conditions conclude that there is 
an influence of growing incomes on higher demand 
for heating and cooling.  
Electricity demand will also be influenced by 
changes in technology, including by how cooling is 
generated (e.g. by district or waste heat and 
absorption techniques), and by changing the 
construction of buildings. Electricity demand is 
expected to decrease slightly in Nordic and Baltic 
countries, particularly where electricity makes up a 
substantial part of heating energy (e.g. Norway or 
Sweden). In terms of heating expenses, climate 
change will thus yield greater benefits than costs in 
northern Europe. The opposite will be true for 
southern Europe. These regional differences may 
require transnational compensation systems to 
balance inequitable effects. 
Box 1. Case Study of Switzerland 
A case study of the ADAM project estimates Swiss 
electricity demand for cooling and air-conditioning 
to more than double by 2035 under the business-as-
usual scenario. 60% of the projected increase can be 
attributed to an expansion of partially or fully air 
conditioned spaces in buildings. The remaining 40% 
of the increase result from higher specific 
requirements of the space that is already air-
conditioned. 
Climate change is estimated to raise total electricity 
demand of buildings in Switzerland by 5-10% (up to 
15% in specific cases). The impact in Mediterranean 
countries is likely to be higher. Data for these 
countries will be available later in 2008. 
Depending on the magnitude of climate change in 
the next decades, there will be some substantial 
                                                      
5 The business-as-usual scenario assumes that global 
average temperature will rise by 4° C compared to pre-
industrial levels (Van Vuuren et al., 2007). 
effects on the energy/electricity system. These will 
include a reduction in demand for heating energy in 
all countries in winter and additional electricity 
demand for air-conditioning and cooling in summer. 
A possible shift towards electricity in the European 
car sector can lead to a surge in electricity demand 
and a major shift in transportation technology and 
‘fuelling’ infrastructures. Compared to such a 
transformation, the expected rise in electricity 
demand for cooling, water pumping and 
desalinisation can be considered small. The 
coincidence of high cooling demand, increased 
water demand (e.g. for agriculture) and reduced 
plant efficiency during heat waves in summer could 
require additional peak power supply. These 
problems could, however, be overcome by better 
long-distance transmission connectivity, smart grids 
and electricity storage facilities. 
2.  Policy instruments: Enabling and 
shaping the transition 
Political feasibility is essential for climate policy 
instruments
6 to be successful. Policy-makers thus 
need to take into consideration how various 
stakeholders are affected by different measures in 
terms of costs and incentives, changing boundary 
conditions and technical innovations. Rising global 
prices of fossil fuels, emissions cap-and-trade 
systems with increasingly strict caps, and specified 
feed-in-tariffs for renewables are likely to increase 
electricity prices, although efficiencies of thermal 
power plants and cost reductions of renewables 
compensate for much of these policy-induced price 
increases. While most electricity consumers will be 
able to cope with price increases by more efficient 
use of electricity, a few producers of electricity-
intensive basic products will need specific attention 
(see section 4.2). 
The electricity sector case study of the ADAM 
project emphasises three dimensions of climate 
policy instruments (see Table 1):  
i)  Polluter pays principle: the effect of climate 
policies on the transfer of rent (tax vs. quota, 
price vs. non-price);  
ii)  Technology neutrality: the effect of climate 
policies on the choice of technology or fuel, i.e. 
a differentiation between neutral and specific 
instruments (quota system alone vs. 
supplemented by feed in tariffs, standards etc.); 
and 
                                                      
6 For example, emissions trading, subsidies, feed-in 
tariffs, R&D support, technical standards, labelling, 
professional training, etc. 6 |Eskeland, Jochem, Neufeldt, Traber, Rive & Behrens 
iii) Research and development (R&D): time horizon 
of climate policies, i.e. quick emission 
reductions or emphasis on R&D for long-term 
technological change. 
In the EU, tradable permits (in the context of the EU 
emissions trading system, EU ETS) are always 
found in combination with support for energy 
efficiency and renewables. Support measures often 
include cross subsidies, such as green certificates 
and feed-in tariffs. This combination of instruments 
may be justified by the combination of climate 
change-related objectives (polluter pays principle) 
with innovation and industrial policy objectives 
(first-mover advantage in global markets). In 
addition, R&D policies are implemented across 
Europe, but at modest levels. An analysis of current 
mitigation policies shows that: i) polluters are not 
fully charged for their emissions, i.e. emissions 
prices are relatively low compared to estimated 
external costs to society, ii) the system is not 
technology neutral and may fail to support some 
options, and iii) long-term R&D is insufficient due 
to low expected emissions prices. Short-term R&D 
for renewables is generally well supported via 
market-based instruments, such as feed-in tariffs 
and green certificates. R&D support for efficiency 
solutions, however, is far less pronounced. Table 1 
summarises these findings. 
As suggested by public choice theory, groups with 
concentrated interests are better at influencing 
policy in Europe than poorly organised groups with 
widely dispersed interests. This is well reflected in 
the different lobbying powers of electricity suppliers 
(e.g. nuclear, renewables) and end-users (e.g. 
focusing more on efficiency). In addition, the 
interests of future generations – those most affected 
by climate change – are only weakly represented by 
some NGOs.  
Table 1. Assessment of European climate policy instruments 
Dimensions of climate change mitigation policy instruments   
Full polluter pays principle  Technology neutrality  R&D 
#1. EU ETS  Yes and No.  
Not fully realised with freely 
distributed quotas. 
Yes, for the sectors 
included.  
No.  
Expected future emissions prices 
often too low.  
#2. Cross subsidies 
of RES-E 
No. 
Tax part often fails to raise 
prices.  
No.  
Support is typically 
technology specific. 
Cross subsidies assist in 
dissemination, but not far-
reaching R&D.  
#3. Energy 
efficiency support 
Energy efficiency support often 
circumvents polluter pays 
principle. 
Standards, labels and 
energy efficiency support 
are often technology 
specific.  
Energy efficiency typically acts 
in the short term, not on long 
term R&D.  
#4. R&D support  Yes for intellectual property 
rights. 
No for R&D support in public 
budgets. 
R&D support is typically 
technology specific.  
Yes.  
Tends to overcome barriers for 
the development of climate 
friendly technologies. Efficiency 
is a big challenge.  
Policy mix  The sum of these four types of 
instruments typically leaves 
emissions prices too low to 
allow for a full implementation 
of the polluter pays principle. 
Some technologies are 
supported, others not. 
Long-term R&D often suffers: 
expected prices are too low, 
R&D support too low.  
Source: Eskeland & Linnerud (forthcoming). 
The following characteristics of the electricity sector 
need to be considered for choosing the analytical 
framework: 
i.  The electricity sector predominantly relies on 
long-lived assets, with high fixed (and sunk) 
costs. Examples on the supply side include 
power plants based on coal, nuclear or hydro as 
well as transmission lines and distribution grids. 
On the demand side, examples include long-
lasting production plants and machinery (e.g. 
electric steel, primary aluminium, copper, 
cement mills, paper machines) and equipment 
such as pumps, compressor or ventilation 
systems. 
ii.  Coal and lignite thermal power plants are heavy 
polluters in terms of greenhouse gas emissions, 
while renewables and nuclear are relatively 
clean. Thus, producers of the same output may 
very differently be affected by policy 
instruments.  The Future of European Electricity | 7 
iii.  Greenhouse gas emissions reductions are costly 
in electricity generation, requiring investment in 
new capacity, typically in renewables, nuclear 
or carbon capture and storage (CCS). On the 
other hand, reductions on the demand side are 
often highly profitable, but undiscovered by 
investors and obstructed by various barriers. 
iv.  With limited trade across Europe’s external 
borders and a fairly inelastic demand, European 
policy can greatly influence the user price of 
electricity (i.e. electricity tariffs) in Europe, but 
with little influence on the efficient use of 
electricity.  
As a result of these characteristics, full 
implementation of the polluter pays principle would 
induce intensive search for optimal solutions in 
electricity generation. However, it would also place 
a burden on electricity-intensive industries and 
reduce asset values unevenly. In addition, it would 
not be a very forceful incentive to exploit profitable 
potentials of efficient electricity use by most end-
users.  
Both member states and the EU, therefore, reject the 
implementation of full payment for external 
damages (i.e. the polluter pays principle), and are 
opting instead for combinations of policy 
instruments in order to overcome obstacles on the 
demand side and to promote non-fossil options with 
substantial innovative and cost-reduction potentials 
on the supply side. Such instruments include quotas, 
renewables support and the alleviation of barriers to 
the efficient use of electricity in final energy sectors. 
In brief, a combination of policy instruments can 
initiate a transition while imposing a smaller burden 
on firms and consumers, albeit at the cost of 
technology neutrality.  
It is likely that the ETS together with renewables 
support schemes will succeed both in creating 
pressures for emissions reductions from existing 
polluters and in assisting the introduction of 
currently known low-carbon technologies in 
electricity supply. These support mechanisms allow 
for more efficient electricity generation and low-
emitting technologies to be introduced without 
higher prices for emissions and electricity. The 
stimulation of long-term R&D, however, is 
dependent on new ideas for technical innovations 
(e.g. electricity production in North Africa and 
transmission to Europe, thermo-electrical solutions) 
and on sufficiently high (expected) emissions and 
electricity prices. If these prices are too low, other 
means of support for energy technology R&D 
should be taken into consideration (e.g. public 
support). 
3.  Technologies and technological 
change 
When dealing with the implementation of cost-
effective options for emissions reductions by 2020, 
major questions for Europe revolve around three 
sets of questions:  
•  How much electricity will be required in Europe 
by 2020 and beyond? How much additional 
electricity demand can be expected due to 
information and communications technologies, 
automation, or electric cars? 
•  What level of emissions reductions will be 
achievable through the deployment of available 
and (almost) market-ready technologies? Such 
technology options include efficiency measures 
in use and generation of electricity, intensified 
use of renewables, nuclear energy or natural gas 
as primary energy sources, etc.  
•  What level of emissions reductions could be 
achieved by new technologies yet to be 
developed, and by when? Future technologies 
may include fuel cells, thermoelectric 
applications, and carbon capture and storage, etc. 
The EU’s target of reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions by at least 20% by 2020 can be met at 
moderate costs, particularly by more efficient 
energy use in all final energy sectors. According to 
its share in EU GHG emissions, the electricity 
sector would be responsible for contributing 40% to 
total EU emissions reductions.
7 However, due to 
comparatively low abatement costs, the electricity 
generation is likely to contribute more than its 
proportional share to EU27 emissions reductions. 
Low-cost mitigation options in electricity generation 
are mainly based on investments in new and highly 
efficient plants, fuel switching to natural gas and 
selected renewables in favourable conditions. In 
almost all sectors, profitable potentials of electricity 
use are most important, but often neglected due to a 
lack of knowledge and information or hindered by 
various barriers and market imperfections.  
Technological change induced by innovation, high 
prices for fossil fuels and political measures to 
control GHG emissions could lead to entirely 
different energy and electricity systems and 
generation structures. Uncertainty about future 
electricity demand and climate variability may also 
                                                      
7 Results are based on two models: GRACE-EL (general 
equilibrium model) and EMILIE (energy market model). 
We assume an annual GDP growth of about 2% in 
Europe until 2030. It is also assumed that electricity 
demand in a business-as-usual scenario is growing at a 
rate of 1% annually, reflecting a partial decoupling of 
primary energy demand from economic growth. 8 |Eskeland, Jochem, Neufeldt, Traber, Rive & Behrens 
induce new generating capacities with shorter life 
times. Retrofitting of existing thermal power plants 
at their present sites and capacities to adapt to 
climate change could become less standard than in 
the past.  
3.1  The scope for technological change 
in the medium term  
Focusing on available technologies (see above) is 
justified due to their importance for reducing energy 
electricity demand and related emissions. However, 
too much emphasis on these measures may limit 
large-scale technological change, including the 
development of yet unknown or currently very 
costly power production options, such as fuel cells 
or thermoelectric solutions. There is a tension 
between support that is directed towards existing 
technologies and support that favours the potential 
of the unknown. R&D support will be severely 
challenged to get this balance right. It should not 
focus too much on near-term gains, but also on more 
basic research laying the foundation for far-reaching 
technological change. 
Dealing with technological change thus raises 
various questions on how to facilitate the 
deployment of new technological options in the long 
run: 
•  Do existing policy instruments over-emphasise 
existing responses (such as improvements of 
fossil thermal power plants), thus limiting more 
far-reaching technological change (including 
certain renewables)? 
•  Are price assumptions and the availability of 
natural gas critical for technological change (e.g. 
with respect to renewables, nuclear power plants 
or coal-based plants with CCS)? 
•  Does the relative or absolute decline of energy-
intensive industries limit the scope of 
technological change (i.e. new surplus capacities 
may be detrimental to efficient electricity use or 
expansion of renewables)?  
Furthermore, the effects of policies that combine 
cap-and-trade instruments (like the EU ETS) with 
renewables support on price expectations for 
electricity and emissions and thus on investments in 
far-reaching technological change need to be 
analysed. ADAM research shows that a moderate 
tightening of the EU ETS, which tends to accelerate 
obsolescence and replacement of assets in the power 
sector until 2010, does not change the preferred 
fossil fuel carrier but rather the choice of more or 
less efficient generating technology. Equally 
important is the role of natural gas. If Europe 
chooses to (or is forced to) limit the expansion of 
gas use (e.g. for energy security reasons), this will 
raise the costs of emissions reductions and of 
electricity in the intermediate term, but it will also 
stimulate innovative technologies in the end-use 
sectors.  
The role of policy in inducing far-reaching 
technological change is undisputed. At the same 
time, a lack of coherent strategies may also impede 
the introduction of low-carbon solutions. The risks 
of too narrow policy solutions may be illustrated by 
the following example: Cooling may be achieved by 
means of conventional technologies (i.e. air 
conditioning by compressors) or by means of other 
options that are much less energy intensive, such as: 
passive/non-mechanical ventilation, overnight 
cooling, design, spatial planning, etc. However, 
compared to a scenario with electricity-powered 
cooling systems – associated with strong technology 
fix and largely autonomous responses of private 
agents – the other options require much more 
planned adaptation strategies such as building 
standards, fiscal incentives and integrated multi-
purpose landscape planning. 
In this context, the need for a coherent, stable and 
predictable policy framework needs to be stressed. 
While there is little doubt about the ability of 
industry and customers to cope with climate change 
in the medium and long-term, this can only be 
achieved with clearly stated and credible challenges.  
3.2  Carbon capture and storage as an 
intermediate illustration 
Perhaps mid-way between currently known and far-
reaching technological change is carbon capture and 
storage (CCS), whose development is dependent on 
GHG emissions reduction targets in the EU and on 
the price of emissions. With early regulation on the 
EU level, CCS is expected to have some first minor 
impacts by 2020. IEA (International Energy 
Agency) technology perspectives and own 
calculations illustrate that hard coal with CCS can 
be competitive in Europe at emissions prices beyond 
€15-20 per tonne of CO2 and power prices beyond 
4-4.5 eurocents per kWh. At higher emission prices, 
natural gas with CCS becomes competitive. Thus, 
under stringent emissions reduction targets, CCS is 
very likely to be relevant even for gas-fired 
electricity generating thermal plants.  
These results reflect the technological options until 
2020-30. Alternative assumptions, such as tighter 
emission caps combined with less availability of 
natural gas (and/or higher gas prices), may prove 
more favourable to technological change, including 
CCS. However, CCS should be carefully assessed 
regarding carbon leakage, risk management and 
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3.3  Long-term technological 
developments 
Public expenditures on research and development of 
energy technology, including on electricity, are 
relatively low and have been falling by about half 
during the last 30 years. An expansion of public 
support to R&D could play a role in accelerating 
efficiency gains of traditional and new generation 
technologies and renewable energies. It could also 
help to create more efficient solutions in end uses of 
electricity. Public funds for R&D will be especially 
important if emissions and electricity prices are low. 
Too low prices deter private investments in 
technological developments needed to combat 
climate change. 
Especially those technologies that are presently 
immature may realise an increase in efficiency and a 
decrease in costs (e.g. fuel cells, thermoelectric 
applications, several renewables, smart grids). For 
this reason, the technology choices by 2020 may 
have important consequences for the development 
of technologies that are state of the art in the long 
term.  
The enormous variety of mitigation solutions of 
electricity demand and generation (including 
imports from North Africa via high voltage, 
constant current power lines) offer a large potential 
for reducing electricity-related GHG emissions, 
possibly at a scale and with a complexity greater 
than in other energy-using sectors. The options 
should be carefully observed and promoted; CCS 
should be searched regarding risk management and 
public acceptance. 
4.  European choices in a global context 
A common concern about stringent emissions 
reduction targets is that they could lead to a re-
allocation of fuel and electricity-intensive industries 
to countries where climate legislation is less 
stringent. Such a development would speed up 
structural change and could lead to additional 
unemployment in Europe. Also, it would be 
counterproductive to climate change mitigation 
efforts, as emissions reductions by countries with a 
strict climate policy could be (more than) offset by 
increases in other countries. This effect is called 
‘carbon leakage’.  
However, the ‘carbon leakage’ argument may not be 
as strong because many electricity-intensive 
industries have already experienced substantial 
growth in countries not bound by emissions 
constraints in the Kyoto Protocol (e.g. primary 
aluminium, copper, pulp). Similarly, favourable 
domestic primary energy sources (e.g. hydro power 
in Canada or Iceland, coal-based power in Australia, 
natural gas in Qatar) will continue to play an 
important role, often unrelated to emissions policies. 
In addition, some of the electricity-intensive basic 
products are either too bulky and inexpensive to be 
shipped over great distances (e.g. cement) or for 
other reasons their value chains depend less on 
electricity prices and more on close location to 
customers, reliability of quality and services, and 
properties of the final products.  
4.1  Europe's impact on the world  
Stringent mitigation targets in Europe have the 
potential to bring about new efficient solutions in 
electricity use in all sectors of the economy, such as 
new solutions for co- and tri-generation, highly 
efficient thermal power plants, new technologies 
using renewable energies, and reduced costs of 
those new technologies through learning and scale 
effects. This effect of guiding the technological 
pathways may be exemplified by the cases 
summarised below that not only reflect 
manufacturing and global networking of companies, 
but also transfer of knowledge and skills. 
•  Large power plants are constructed by a few 
global players only. Strict European CO2 targets 
for fossil-fuelled thermal power plants will affect 
research activities in Europe and thus also the 
products of these global players (General 
Electric, for example, has built a large research 
centre in Munich, in the last few years). As these 
companies compete worldwide, they will 
certainly resort to the most up-to-date 
technologies, including, for example, CCS, if the 
European Commission made CCS obligatory by 
2020.  
•  Similar processes of technology advancements 
and transfer can be observed by smaller 
companies in the areas of energy efficiency or 
renewable energies. Many European wind 
technology manufacturers, for example, have 
founded joint ventures in Asian countries, as 
have manufacturers of control techniques, power 
electronics or efficient motor systems.  
•  There are many (and an increasing number of) 
large production companies worldwide that have 
introduced company-wide technological 
standards in order to reduce transaction cost. 
Examples include: oil companies such as BP or 
Shell, car producers such as Volkswagen or Fiat, 
chemical companies such as BASF and 
consumer goods industries such as Procter & 
Gamble. Where European production sites are in 
the lead regarding energy efficiency and low 
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a company worldwide and thus the performance 
of the competing companies as well.  
•  Many talented students in engineering, natural 
sciences and business economics coming from 
Asia or Latin America get their education in 
European universities and early work experience 
in European employment. In the last few years, 
many European universities started master 
programmes in technical or economic higher 
education. Young Chinese or Indian students 
from these programmes will advance quickly and 
influence standards and practices in buildings 
and machinery. If Europe chooses a stringent 
climate policy, this will have an impact on the 
research and the content of courses in European 
universities, and hence on students from 
emerging countries. 
In summary, the medium- to long-term impact of a 
stringent climate change policy in Europe may have 
the potential to guide and accelerate the world’s 
technological path into a sustainable direction of 
more efficient electricity use and generation. This 
process will partly be realised by global players, 
human capacity-building in Europe and financial 
incentives such as CDM and JI.  
4.2  Dealing with global competition 
An ambitious European climate policy should strike 
the right balance, pushing industry and technology 
to make progress that enhances productivity and 
competitiveness alongside emissions reductions.  
Raising the pressure to mitigate is likely to lead to a 
certain amount of carbon leakage. In particular 
electricity- and emission-intensive basic products 
and industries (e.g. primary aluminium, copper) 
may migrate out of Europe. While this lowers 
emissions in Europe (but probably not globally), it 
reduces the industries’ willingness to invest in 
technological change. At the same time, emissions 
prices in Europe will be lower than they would 
otherwise be. It is thus important to deal with the 
issue of carbon leakage and to introduce some 
special treatment for European industry in 
electricity-intensive sectors.  
Analysis done in the ADAM project indicates that it 
may be sensible to use some policy instruments to 
shield energy-intensive industries from competitive 
pressures (e.g. by means of border tax adjustments). 
Such limited protection of a few electricity-intensive 
products will significantly reduce carbon leakage 
and will raise the potential for technological 
progress by increasing emissions costs and 
electricity prices. The emissions reduction targets 
set for 2020 will not be jeopardised, even though 
their achievement will be slightly more costly. 
On the other hand, international trade can also 
benefit global efforts to combat climate change as it 
allows for efficient and low- (or zero) carbon 
solutions to be produced cost effectively in 
countries with low labour costs and to diffuse 
quickly on world markets. In recent years, European 
know-how has increasingly been used to produce 
investment goods in Asia to reduce the costs of 
those technologies. One example is small hydro-
turbines produced in Indonesia. However, the 
competitive advantage of low labour costs may not 
yet have been realised to its full potential in terms of 
some investment goods, such as energy-efficient 
solutions or electricity generation from renewable 
energy sources.  
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